Military Education Exchanges: China’s Expanding Soft Power in PNG

A recent article in the Post-Courier titled “Strengthening China–PNG Relations Through Military Engagements” sheds light on the deepening defence ties between PNG and China. Among the developments highlighted is the expansion of scholarship opportunities for PNGDF officers and other government officials to undertake military training and educational programs in China. The number of participants has increased to fourteen this year, indicating Beijing’s growing interest in building enduring relationships with PNG’s security institutions through education diplomacy.

Ambassador Yang Xiaoguang, Minister for Defence Dr. Billy Joseph, and Defence Attaché Colonel Jiang Tuan pose with PNGDF officials at the Chinese Embassy in Port Moresby during the 2025 military scholarship presentation, reinforcing bilateral defence ties through education and training exchanges. (Image: Post-Courier, 29 July 2025).

While discussions about China’s strategic ambitions in PNG often focus on infrastructure investments and economic influence, the role of training and education in shaping long-term alignments deserves closer scrutiny. Chinese military academies now host PNGDF personnel as well as officials from the police and civil service. These individuals receive instruction not only in technical military fields but also in leadership, logistics, and civil-military integration. The curriculum is embedded with Chinese doctrines and security perspectives, which subtly shape the worldview of participating officers.

The significance of these educational exchanges lies not in the short-term transfer of skills, but in the creation of institutional memory and professional loyalties. Officers who receive training in China often return to PNG to assume senior roles in their respective institutions. Their decision-making may subsequently be informed by the training received abroad, influencing policy preferences, procurement processes, and inter-agency cooperation frameworks. The growing cohort of Chinese-trained officers thus represents a quiet but strategic shift in PNG’s defence orientation.

In the broader Pacific context, PNG is not alone in this experience. Countries such as Fiji and Solomon Islands have similarly engaged with China on police and military training. These programs are part of a deliberate effort by Beijing to cultivate familiarity and trust among key decision-makers in the region. Unlike traditional Western military exchanges, which often come with political and governance conditions, China offers what appears to be unconditional support—an appealing proposition for under-resourced and capacity-stretched institutions.

This strategy aligns with China’s global push under its Global Security Initiative to promote alternative security partnerships that emphasize non-interference and mutual respect. Through training exchanges, China embeds its security ethos within the professional ranks of partner countries. This soft power approach has long-term implications for how countries like PNG position themselves in an increasingly multipolar world, where competition between China and traditional powers is intensifying across all domains, including defence and security.

For PNG, the challenge lies in navigating these partnerships without undermining its long-standing ties with traditional allies such as Australia and the US. These partners have also invested heavily in professional development and military cooperation with PNG, and their programs are often grounded in shared values of democracy, transparency, and human rights. A shift in training dependence toward China could potentially create policy dissonance, interoperability issues, and institutional fragmentation within PNG’s security apparatus.

There is a pressing need for a more coordinated and transparent national policy on foreign military training. Parliament and the National Executive Council must be regularly briefed on the nature and scope of these exchanges to ensure they serve the national interest and do not compromise PNG’s strategic autonomy. A diversified approach to training—balancing Chinese offerings with Western partnerships—would allow PNG to extract maximum benefits while preserving institutional neutrality and professional independence.

In conclusion, military education and training exchanges have emerged as one of China’s most effective tools of soft power in PNG. They are shaping the future composition, orientation, and possibly even the loyalty of PNG’s defence and security leadership. As these exchanges deepen, PNG must develop safeguards to ensure that its defence and foreign policy remain sovereign, balanced, and firmly rooted in its constitutional values and long-term national security objectives.