Beyond UNCLOS: What the Torres Strait Treaty and PNG’s Oceans Policy Reveal About Maritime Governance

By Bernard Yegiora 

The debate surrounding the Jomard Passage has largely centred on one dominant argument: PNG cannot move toward any form of transit fee or stronger regulatory control because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) guarantees freedom of passage through international waterways. This position is often presented as absolute and legally fixed. However, the reality of maritime governance is far more nuanced. International maritime law is not applied mechanically in every context, and state practice demonstrates that countries frequently negotiate tailored arrangements to reflect geography, security concerns, environmental protection, and national interests. The Torres Strait Treaty between PNG and Australia illustrates this clearly.

The Torres Strait Treaty established a unique governance framework balancing sovereignty, border management, fisheries cooperation, environmental protection, and the traditional movement rights of local communities. It was specifically designed around the realities of the region and demonstrates that maritime governance can evolve beyond rigid textbook interpretations of international law when states identify compelling strategic and political interests.

At the outset, an important distinction must be made. The Torres Strait Treaty is not a direct legal precedent for PNG to impose tolls on international shipping through the Jomard Passage. The Treaty was not created to commercialise maritime passage or generate transit revenue. Its primary purpose was to manage a sensitive maritime border while preserving traditional livelihoods and maintaining cooperation between neighbouring states.

However, the Treaty remains strategically significant because it establishes a broader principle: maritime governance frameworks can be adapted and negotiated. UNCLOS provides the foundation for international maritime law, but bilateral and regional agreements frequently shape how those rules are interpreted and operationalised in practice. This demonstrates that the international system contains more flexibility than is often assumed.

For PNG, this opens an important policy conversation. The Jomard Passage debate should therefore not be framed as a simplistic attempt to challenge UNCLOS or restrict freedom of navigation. Rather, it should be understood as part of a broader discussion about how PNG governs, secures, and economically utilises its maritime domain.

This is precisely where the National Oceans Policy 2020–2030 becomes highly relevant. The policy itself acknowledges that PNG’s oceans and maritime resources have historically been managed in a “policy vacuum” and that the country has failed to optimise the economic benefits of its strategic ocean assets. The policy further recognises that PNG’s maritime boundaries are not effectively monitored or controlled because of limited resources, weak coordination, and underdeveloped maritime domain awareness. 

Cover page of the National Oceans Policy of Papua New Guinea 2020–2030, a foundational policy framework promoting integrated oceans management, sustainable economic development, maritime security, environmental protection, and the strategic governance of Papua New Guinea’s maritime domain. 

These admissions are important because they reinforce the argument that PNG’s maritime governance challenge is not theoretical—it is operational. The country possesses one of the largest maritime jurisdictions in the Pacific, yet lacks the sustainable financing and integrated governance structures necessary to secure and manage it effectively.

The National Oceans Policy was specifically designed to address these weaknesses through an Integrated Oceans Management framework. It promotes a whole-of-government approach linking ocean governance, economic development, environmental protection, international relations, and maritime security into a unified system. The policy also embraces the concept of the Blue Economy, recognising that ocean resources and maritime spaces must contribute to sustainable national development.

Viewed in this context, the Jomard Passage discussion becomes part of a larger strategic issue. PNG is not simply debating transit fees. It is debating how strategic waterways within its maritime domain should be governed, secured, and economically integrated into national development planning.

This is where the concept of Blue Security becomes directly applicable. As argued in my earlier work, Blue Security links maritime governance, economic strategy, and national security into a coherent framework. If PNG intends to strengthen maritime domain awareness, improve surveillance capacity, combat illegal fishing, and protect critical sea lanes, then sustainable financing mechanisms will be required. Strategic maritime corridors such as the Jomard Passage can contribute to that effort through carefully structured governance arrangements tied to navigation services, environmental protection, maritime safety, and security management.

Importantly, such an approach would be far more sophisticated than simply announcing arbitrary tolls. The stronger argument is that PNG should progressively develop a managed maritime governance regime that reflects its sovereign responsibilities, environmental obligations, and security requirements while remaining consistent with international law and regional cooperation.

The broader international environment also supports this discussion. Around the world, maritime governance is becoming increasingly contested and adaptive. States are reassessing how strategic waterways are managed in response to geopolitical competition, environmental risks, and economic pressures. Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz and debates surrounding the Malacca Strait illustrate that maritime governance is evolving globally. PNG cannot afford to remain passive while strategic maritime spaces around the world are being reassessed.

At the same time, PNG must avoid appearing confrontational or legally reckless. The strength of the Torres Strait example lies not in confrontation, but in negotiated adaptation and cooperative governance. The Treaty works because it is grounded in legitimacy, mutual recognition of interests, and practical management realities. Any future governance model for the Jomard Passage would similarly require careful diplomacy, legal preparation, institutional capacity, and regional engagement.

The broader lesson is therefore not that PNG should ignore UNCLOS. Rather, it is that international maritime governance allows room for innovation, strategic adaptation, and tailored governance arrangements suited to national circumstances. The Torres Strait Treaty demonstrates this flexibility, while the National Oceans Policy provides PNG with the domestic policy foundation to think more strategically about its maritime future.

Ultimately, the Jomard Passage debate is not just about shipping routes or transit fees. It is about how PNG understands sovereignty, secures its maritime domain, and transforms its ocean space into a strategic national asset.