Strengthening the National Security Agency: Why PNG’s Scientific Community Matters

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By Bernard Yegiora

China’s recent intercontinental ballistic missile test in the Pacific generated considerable regional debate. Political leaders, diplomats, defence officials and commentators focused on the strategic meaning of the launch, the implications for Pacific security and the responsibility of major powers operating in the region.

For PNG, the debate also exposed a more fundamental national security question:

Does the country possess the scientific and technical expertise required to independently assess complex strategic technologies?

This question extends far beyond one missile test. The contemporary security environment is increasingly shaped by ballistic missiles, satellite systems, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, autonomous weapons, biotechnology, quantum technologies and advanced surveillance systems. These are not issues that can be understood through political analysis alone. They require scientific expertise.

PNG’s National Security Policy 2024–2029 already recognises this reality. The Policy identifies the Scientific Community as one of the country’s core national security communities. It places the Research, Science and Technology Secretariat at the centre of efforts to monitor scientific threats, coordinate research and provide scientific advice to the National Security Council and the National Executive Council through the National Security Agency.

This is an important policy foundation. The challenge is now to operationalise it.

The NIO Bulletin provides further insight into how PNG’s emerging national security architecture is being conceptualized and coordinated through specialized security communities under the NSA framework.

The National Security Agency’s Coordinating Role

The National Security Agency is intended to coordinate the different communities that contribute to national security. These include law enforcement, strategic intelligence, defence, cybersecurity, emergency management and the scientific community.

The Scientific Community should therefore not operate as a separate academic or research network with limited influence on government decisions. It should be fully integrated into the National Security Agency’s coordination, assessment and advisory processes.

The National Security Agency should be able to draw on scientific expertise whenever the Government is required to assess a complex technological issue. This may include a missile launch, cyberattack, satellite disruption, radiation concern, biological threat, infrastructure failure or emerging defence technology.

The purpose is not to turn scientists into security officers. It is to ensure that national security assessments are informed by accurate technical knowledge.

Diplomats interpret intentions. Intelligence officers assess threats. Defence officials evaluate operational implications. Scientists explain the capabilities and limitations of the technologies involved.

A credible national security system requires all of them.

The Missile Test as a Capability Test

The recent missile debate provides a practical example.

China described its launch as a routine military training activity, not directed at any country, and conducted after notifying relevant states. The United States uses similar language when explaining its own Minuteman III tests across the Pacific, describing them as routine, pre-planned and intended to verify the reliability of its strategic deterrent.

PNG can assess the diplomatic wording of these statements. However, independently evaluating their technical dimensions requires specialist expertise.

Questions may include:

  • What type of missile was tested?
  • What was its likely trajectory?
  • Was it nuclear-armed or merely nuclear-capable?
  • What kind of re-entry vehicle was involved?
  • Was there any environmental or radiation risk?
  • What did the test reveal about the operator’s military capability?
  • Were the official explanations technically credible?

Without scientific expertise, PNG remains dependent on information provided by the same powers conducting the tests, or on assessments produced by foreign governments, militaries and research institutions.

That dependence weakens sovereign decision-making.

Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko's remarks highlight the need for independent scientific and technical advice to support ministerial statements on complex security issues such as missile testing.

The Scientific Community Is Already in the Policy

The central issue is not whether PNG should create a scientific role in national security. The National Security Policy has already done that.

The real issue is whether the Scientific Community has sufficient personnel, institutional access, funding and influence to perform the role assigned to it.

This is where the National Security Agency must provide leadership.

The Agency should identify the scientific expertise already available within government, universities, research institutions and industry. It should then determine where the major capability gaps exist.

Priority areas are likely to include:

  • nuclear physics and radiation science;
  • aerospace and missile technology;
  • cybersecurity;
  • artificial intelligence;
  • geospatial and satellite analysis;
  • environmental science;
  • biotechnology;
  • data science; and
  • critical infrastructure protection.

The immediate objective should not be to create a large new bureaucracy. It should be to establish a reliable mechanism through which the National Security Agency can access trusted scientific expertise when required.

Building a Scientific Advisory Network

A practical first step would be the establishment of a Scientific and Technology Advisory Panel under the coordination of the National Security Agency.

The panel could include specialists from:

  • the Research, Science and Technology Secretariat;
  • the Department of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology;
  • PNG universities;
  • government technical agencies;
  • the defence and intelligence communities;
  • professional scientific bodies; and
  • relevant private-sector institutions.

The panel would provide technical assessments, contribute to strategic forecasting and support national security planning.

For highly specialised issues, such as nuclear-capable missile testing, the National Security Agency could commission advice from nuclear physicists, aerospace engineers, radiation specialists and strategic analysts. One expert alone would not be sufficient. The scientific problem would need to be examined through a multidisciplinary process.

Universities and Research Institutions

PNG’s universities should be recognised as strategic partners within the national security architecture.

In an earlier article, Beyond Waigani: Where Do Provincial Intelligence Committees fit?, I argued that national security should not remain concentrated within central government institutions. Provincial governments, local institutions and communities must also contribute to national resilience.

The same principle applies to the scientific community.

National security expertise does not reside only in Waigani. It can also be found in university departments, laboratories, technical agencies, professional networks and research institutions throughout the country.

The National Security Agency should establish formal relationships with these institutions. This could include research partnerships, technical advisory arrangements, fellowships, secondments and joint policy studies.

Such partnerships would allow the Government to draw on existing expertise while also strengthening the national scientific community.

Investing in Future Expertise

PNG’s scientific security capability cannot be built through short-term appointments alone. It requires long-term investment in human capital.

The Government should support targeted postgraduate training in fields relevant to national security, including:

  • nuclear physics;
  • aerospace engineering;
  • radiation science;
  • artificial intelligence;
  • cyber security;
  • satellite systems;
  • geospatial intelligence;
  • advanced data science;
  • biotechnology; and
  • critical infrastructure engineering.

These programs should be linked to workforce planning. Scholarship recipients should have clear opportunities to serve within government agencies, universities, research institutions and the National Security Agency’s advisory network.

PNG should also establish partnerships with international organisations and reputable scientific institutions. Relevant partners may include the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and regional universities with strong technical programs.

However, international cooperation should strengthen PNG’s own capability rather than substitute for it.

From Policy Recognition to Implementation

The National Security Policy 2024–2029 has already identified the Scientific Community as part of PNG’s national security architecture. This is a significant achievement.

The next step is implementation.

The National Security Agency should:

  1. conduct a national audit of scientific expertise relevant to security;
  2. establish a Scientific and Technology Advisory Panel;
  3. integrate scientists into strategic assessments and crisis-response exercises;
  4. develop protocols for obtaining rapid technical advice;
  5. support scholarships in priority scientific fields;
  6. strengthen partnerships with universities and research institutions; and
  7. ensure scientific advice reaches the National Security Council and National Executive Council through established channels.

These measures would strengthen the Agency’s ability to coordinate national security advice and reduce PNG’s reliance on external interpretations.

Conclusion

The recent missile debate demonstrated that PNG can participate in regional strategic discussions. The more important question is whether it can do so from a position of independent knowledge.

PNG does not need to become a military power to strengthen its security. It needs to become more capable of understanding the technologies that shape its strategic environment.

The National Security Policy has already recognised the Scientific Community. The responsibility now rests with the National Security Agency to ensure that this community is organised, supported and integrated into national decision-making.

Scientific capability is not separate from national security. It is part of national security.

A state that cannot independently understand the technologies affecting its security will remain dependent on those who can. For PNG, strengthening the Scientific Community is therefore not merely an investment in research. It is an investment in sovereignty, strategic autonomy and better advice to government.

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