When a Neighbouring Conflict Enters PNG’s Security Environment

By Bernard Yegiora

Part Two of a three-part series on the implications of the West Papua conflict for PNG’s national security.

Part One of this series identified three warning signs emerging from the West Papua conflict: the display of high-powered firearms by armed groups, the killing of an American pilot, and the execution of three Indigenous Papuans accused of being “traitors.”

These incidents indicate increasing armed capability, an expansion in the range of people considered legitimate targets, and a willingness by armed groups to enforce political loyalty through violence.

However, the security implications for PNG do not depend on armed fighters launching a direct attack across the international border.

A neighbouring conflict can enter PNG’s security environment in other ways. It can produce refugee movements, firearms trafficking, intelligence activity, cross-border pursuit, diplomatic pressure and political mobilisation. Its narratives can also influence sensitive domestic issues, particularly Bougainville’s political future.

The latest statements from West Papuan rebels add another dimension. In a video discussed in this series, rebel leaders referred to PNG’s historical intervention in Vanuatu, expressed support for Bougainville’s independence and argued that PNG could similarly assist West Papua.

The West Papua independence movement publicly reaffirms its support for Bougainville’s independence aspirations, highlighting growing political solidarity between the two movements. Link: https://www.facebook.com/reel/1557815489039907

The message presents PNG as more than a neighbouring country. It portrays PNG as Melanesia’s “big brother”: a state with the size, history and regional standing to assist other Melanesian peoples seeking political independence.

That perception creates both influence and risk.

PNG’s National Security Agency and the wider National Security Sector must therefore recognise that the West Papua conflict can cross into PNG’s security environment even before armed fighters physically cross the border.

Security spillover is broader than military incursion

Security spillover is often understood narrowly as the physical movement of armed fighters or foreign security forces across an international boundary.

That is only one form of spillover.

For PNG, the West Papua conflict could produce at least five interconnected effects:

• territorial spillover through unauthorised border crossings;
• humanitarian spillover through refugees and displaced communities;
• criminal spillover through weapons and logistical networks;
• political spillover through Melanesian solidarity and the Bougainville issue; and
• diplomatic spillover through pressure from Indonesia and regional actors.

These risks are amplified by the nature of the PNG–Indonesia border.

The border is a legal and political boundary, but it does not completely separate the people living on either side. Communities maintain customary, family, linguistic, religious and commercial relationships across it.

PNG’s Department of Foreign Affairs recognises that management of the border involves not only security but also migration, culture and development. Its Border and Security Division coordinates PNG–Indonesia border matters through mechanisms such as the Border Liaison Committee and Border Management Committee.

This demonstrates that the border is both a security space and a social space.

That complexity means national agencies cannot simply close the border or treat every person crossing it as a threat. They must distinguish ordinary customary movement from armed, criminal or intelligence-related activity.

The risk of territorial spillover

The most visible danger would be the movement of armed fighters into PNG.

West Papuan combatants could cross the border seeking sanctuary, medical treatment, food, communications equipment or logistical support. They could also attempt to use remote areas inside PNG to reorganise before returning to Indonesian territory.

Even if PNG did not officially support such activity, the presence of armed fighters inside its territory could create a serious diplomatic crisis.

Indonesia might pressure PNG to arrest and surrender suspected combatants. Indonesian forces could also be tempted to pursue armed groups towards or across the border.

An unauthorised incursion by Indonesian military or police personnel would constitute a violation of PNG sovereignty. Yet PNG’s ability to detect, prevent and respond to such an incursion would depend on the presence of personnel, communications, roads, air transport and surveillance capacity in remote border areas.

PNG ratified its Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia in February 2024. The government acknowledged that effective implementation would require improved border infrastructure, additional personnel and other resources for the PNG Defence Force.

That admission remains strategically important.

An agreement on paper does not automatically create operational control over the border. The state must have the physical capability to observe movement, communicate with national authorities and respond quickly to incidents.

The National Security Sector must therefore prepare for several possibilities:

• armed fighters entering PNG voluntarily;
• civilians and fighters crossing together;
• Indonesian security operations approaching the boundary;
• accidental crossings by security personnel;
• deliberate pursuit operations; and
• armed groups attempting to establish temporary support areas inside PNG.

PNG should establish clear sovereignty red lines before such an incident occurs.

West Papuan armed groups must not be permitted to use PNG territory as an operational base. Indonesian security forces must not enter PNG territory in pursuit of them.

The same principle must apply to both sides: PNG territory cannot become an extension of the West Papua conflict.

Refugees and humanitarian pressure

A major escalation of fighting could force more West Papuan civilians into PNG.

This is not a hypothetical concern. PNG has hosted West Papuan refugees for decades. A UNHCR planning document reported that PNG hosted up to 10,000 mainly West Papuan refugees, with the largest historical influx occurring between 1984 and 1986.

More recent fighting has continued to displace civilians within the Indonesian Papuan provinces. Human Rights Watch reported in May 2025 that renewed clashes between Indonesian security forces and Papuan armed groups had threatened civilian populations and forced villagers to flee affected areas.

If violence moves closer to the border, displaced people may travel eastward into West Sepik or Western Province.

PNG would then face immediate operational questions:

1. Where would refugees be received?
2. Which agency would register them?
3. Who would provide shelter, food, water and medical care?
4. How would security agencies distinguish civilian refugees from armed personnel?
5. What would happen to fighters who crossed the border with weapons?
6. Could individuals accused of being informants face retaliation inside refugee communities?

These matters cannot be addressed effectively after thousands of people have already arrived.

The National Security Sector must work with provincial governments, churches, humanitarian organisations and border communities to develop a contingency plan.

Security screening would be necessary, but it must not become collective punishment. West Papuan civilians fleeing violence should not automatically be treated as combatants or criminals.

At the same time, armed fighters cannot be permitted to conceal themselves among refugees while retaining weapons or continuing military operations.

A poorly managed refugee response could create humanitarian suffering, community tensions and diplomatic conflict with Indonesia. It could also allow armed organisations or intelligence operatives to use civilian displacement for operational purposes.

Intelligence activity and danger to border communities

The execution of three Indigenous Papuans accused of being Indonesian informants demonstrates that intelligence activity has become a life-and-death issue within the conflict.

This creates a direct concern for PNG border communities.

Local residents possess information that government agencies often lack. They understand customary crossing routes, family relationships, unusual movements and changes in activity on the Indonesian side.

For this reason, security agencies may increasingly rely on local people for information.

However, the public killing of alleged “traitors” shows the danger faced by anyone suspected of cooperating with security authorities.

A villager who reports the movement of armed men could be accused of spying. A trader who communicates with Indonesian officials could be suspected by West Papuan fighters. A church worker assisting displaced people could be pressured by both sides for information.

PNG agencies must not recruit or expose community informants carelessly.

Intelligence collection must include protective measures, secure communication and strict handling of identities. Information shared between PNG and Indonesia must also be assessed carefully because uncontrolled sharing could expose PNG citizens or West Papuan civilians to retaliation.

The National Intelligence Organization has identified cross-border smuggling, illegal weapons and transnational criminal activity among PNG’s national security threats. Its official policy materials also emphasise the need for coordination and intelligence sharing across the National Security Sector.

West Papua is precisely the type of issue that requires intelligence integration.

No single agency will possess the full picture. The National Security Agency must bring together intelligence from the National Intelligence Organization, PNG Defence Force, police, Immigration, Customs, Foreign Affairs and provincial authorities.

Weapons and criminal spillover

The high-powered firearms displayed by West Papuan fighters raise questions about the origins and movement of weapons and ammunition.

An armed conflict creates demand for firearms, ammunition, communications equipment, fuel, food, medicine and financing.

Criminal actors may exploit that demand.

Some networks may move weapons towards West Papuan armed groups. Others may use the same routes to bring firearms, drugs or contraband into PNG.

This is particularly dangerous because weapons do not remain permanently attached to the conflict for which they were initially acquired.

A rifle moved through the western border could later be sold to criminal groups or tribal fighters inside PNG. Ammunition and weapons may travel through several intermediaries before reaching their final users.

The National Intelligence Organization has already identified cross-border smuggling of illegal weapons and illicit drugs as national security threats.

The West Papua conflict could intensify those existing problems.

The security concern is therefore not only whether PNG-based actors are supplying weapons to rebels. It is also whether the conflict is creating a two-way market that could increase the availability of firearms inside PNG.

This requires cooperation among intelligence agencies, police, the PNG Defence Force, Customs, Immigration and financial investigators.

Authorities must examine:

• possible land and river routes;
• unregulated airstrips;
• maritime connections;
• ammunition supply chains;
• diversion from government armouries;
• financial transfers;
• communications networks; and
• individuals providing transport or logistical assistance.

The National Security Sector should treat each weapons seizure as part of a possible network rather than as an isolated criminal case.

PNG as Melanesia’s “big brother”

The most politically significant development is the way West Papuan rebels are describing PNG’s regional role.

In the video (embbed below) that informed this analysis, rebel representatives argued that PNG had helped liberate Vanuatu, that PNG would assist Bougainville and that PNG could also help West Papua.

The statement constructs a continuous Melanesian liberation narrative linking Vanuatu, Bougainville and West Papua.

Historically, the cases are different.

PNG did not grant Vanuatu independence. Vanuatu became independent from Britain and France on 30 July 1980. PNG subsequently deployed the PNG Defence Force at the request of Vanuatu’s newly established government to suppress the Santo rebellion, which threatened the authority and territorial integrity of the new state. Academic accounts describe the PNGDF intervention as support for the newly independent government of Vanuatu.

Nevertheless, the symbolic interpretation is powerful.

PNG used its military capability to defend a newly independent Melanesian state at a critical point in its history. West Papuan rebels are now using that history to argue that PNG has a continuing responsibility to assist Melanesian independence movements.

This places PNG in the role of Melanesia’s “big brother.”

PNG is the largest independent Melanesian state by population and territory. It possesses greater diplomatic, military and economic weight than its smaller island neighbours. Its decisions can therefore influence regional politics.

But the “big brother” label is not merely complimentary.

It creates expectations.

West Papuan actors may expect PNG to advocate for them within the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific Islands Forum and the United Nations. They may expect PNG to pressure Indonesia, recognise West Papuan political representatives or provide humanitarian and diplomatic assistance.

Some may expect more direct forms of support.

PNG must therefore define what regional leadership means according to its own national interests.

Melanesian leadership could involve promoting peaceful dialogue, supporting human rights, assisting refugees and preventing violence. It should not automatically mean providing sanctuary, weapons, financing or logistical support to an armed movement.

If PNG does not define the boundaries of its leadership role, other actors will define them on PNG’s behalf.

West Papua and the Bougainville question

The rebels’ public support for Bougainville independence brings the West Papua conflict into one of PNG’s most sensitive domestic political processes.

Bougainville’s pathway is legally and politically distinct from the West Papua conflict.

The Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in 2001 following a violent conflict. It established three principal pillars: autonomy, weapons disposal and a referendum on Bougainville’s political status.

In the 2019 referendum, 97.7 per cent of participating voters selected independence. The referendum arose from a negotiated peace process and was conducted through an agreed legal and constitutional framework.

PNG’s Parliament began formal discussions on the referendum outcome in June 2026, with the national government continuing to emphasise a constitutional and parliamentary pathway.

West Papuan armed leaders are therefore attempting to associate themselves with a process that differs fundamentally from their own.

This does not establish an operational relationship between West Papuan rebels and Bougainvillean leaders.

There is no evidence presented here of joint military activity, weapons transfers, financing or organisational cooperation.

Political solidarity must not be misrepresented as an armed alliance.

Nevertheless, the rhetoric is strategically important.

It demonstrates that West Papuan armed actors are seeking to place Bougainville within a broader regional narrative of Melanesian liberation. They may use Bougainville’s referendum as evidence that independence movements can eventually secure political legitimacy.

This could affect PNG in several ways:

• It could strengthen public sympathy for West Papua among Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guineans.
• It could create concern in Indonesia that political or material support networks may emerge inside PNG.
• It could complicate relations between the National Government and the Autonomous Bougainville Government.
• It could also expose the Bougainville peace process to external political messaging from actors who were not parties to the original agreement.

PNG must protect the integrity of the Bougainville process.

That does not mean preventing Bougainvilleans from expressing political views on West Papua. Peaceful advocacy and Melanesian solidarity are legitimate forms of political expression.

However, the National Security Sector must distinguish political sympathy from material support for an armed foreign organisation.

Weapons, military training, recruitment, financing and the facilitation of armed operations would cross a clear security threshold.

Diplomatic pressure from Indonesia

The rebel appeal to PNG could also affect the country’s relationship with Indonesia.

PNG’s formal position remains that West Papua falls within Indonesian sovereignty. Prime Minister James Marape reiterated that position publicly in August 2024.

Indonesia will therefore expect PNG to prevent its territory from being used to support armed operations.

Statements by West Papuan rebels portraying PNG as a potential supporter may increase Indonesian suspicion even when the PNG Government has made no such commitment.

Jakarta may seek stronger border enforcement, increased intelligence sharing and restrictions on West Papuan organisations operating inside PNG.

PNG must manage this pressure carefully.

Security cooperation with Indonesia is necessary because the countries share a long and difficult-to-monitor border. However, cooperation must not compromise PNG sovereignty or result in the automatic transfer of unverified information about PNG citizens, refugees or peaceful activists.

PNG also has an interest in raising civilian protection, refugee movement and security operations near the border with Indonesia.

A stable bilateral relationship should permit direct discussion of difficult matters. It should not require PNG to ignore developments that affect its territory or people.

The strategic risk of being Melanesia’s big brother

PNG’s position as the largest Melanesian state gives it influence. It also creates the risk of strategic overextension.

PNG is being asked symbolically to carry responsibility for Vanuatu’s security history, Bougainville’s political future and West Papua’s aspirations.

Yet PNG continues to face serious internal limitations in policing, border infrastructure, public administration and service delivery.

A state should not accept regional obligations that exceed its institutional capability.

Nor should it allow emotional appeals to Melanesian identity to substitute for strategic assessment.

PNG’s response must balance three principles:

• solidarity with Melanesian peoples;
• respect for sovereignty and peaceful political processes; and
• protection of PNG’s national interests.

These principles do not always point in the same direction.

That is why the West Papua issue cannot be managed through slogans such as “Melanesian brotherhood” or “Indonesia’s internal matter” alone.

Both phrases simplify a much more complex security environment.

Conclusion

The West Papua conflict does not have to cross the border as a conventional armed invasion to affect PNG.

It can enter through refugee movements, firearms trafficking, intelligence operations, cross-border pursuit and diplomatic pressure.

It can also enter through political narratives.

West Papuan rebels are portraying PNG as Melanesia’s “big brother,” drawing upon PNG’s intervention in Vanuatu, its management of the Bougainville process and its regional influence to argue that it should assist West Papua.

That appeal places PNG in a strategically difficult position.

PNG must not allow its territory to support armed attacks against Indonesia. It must also defend its sovereignty against unauthorised foreign security operations. It must protect refugees without allowing combatants to exploit humanitarian movements. It must respect peaceful political advocacy while preventing material support for armed violence.

Most importantly, PNG must define its regional leadership role for itself.

The West Papua conflict is already entering PNG’s security environment through people, weapons, expectations and political narratives.

Part Three of this series will propose the foundations of an NSA-coordinated national strategy involving the National Intelligence Organization, PNG Defence Force, police, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Customs, provincial governments and other agencies within the National Security Sector.

PNG cannot determine the political future of West Papua by itself.

It can, however, determine whether it is prepared for the consequences.