PNG Must Have the Capacity to Direct Its Defence Partnerships

By Bernard Yegiora

Retired Major-General Jerry Singirok raises a legitimate concern in The National’s article, “Defence alliance a worry”, published on 27 October 2026. His warning is that closer defence cooperation with Australia and the United States could create strategic dependency and encourage Papua New Guinean officers to understand security through the priorities of larger powers. 

Screenshot of The National’s report, “Defence alliance a worry” (27 October 2026), highlighting retired Major-General Jerry Singirok’s concerns about PNG’s sovereignty and strategic dependency. Source: The National.

This concern deserves serious consideration. It also raises a practical question: how well equipped are our own institutions and officers to ensure these partnerships serve PNG’s national interests?

My view is that officers in the Department of Defence (DoD) and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) need a strong understanding of our national interests, the threats we face and the institutional capacity problems that limit our response. This understanding should guide the programs and projects we negotiate with Australia and the United States.

Our officers must be able to explain what PNG needs, why it needs it and how a proposed activity will address an identified problem. That requires professional judgement, policy knowledge and the confidence to question proposals that do not adequately reflect our priorities.

Begin with PNG’s security needs

Australia and the United States have their own strategic interests. We should expect their defence engagement to reflect those interests. PNG has the same responsibility to define and pursue its own.

There will be areas of overlap. Preventing transnational crime, improving maritime surveillance and strengthening regional stability can benefit all three countries. However, shared interests do not mean identical priorities. PNG must assess both the benefits of cooperation and the obligations and risks attached to it.

The arrangements also need to be understood accurately. Australia’s Pukpuk Treaty is a mutual defence treaty. The United States’ Defence Cooperation Agreement and the separate maritime law enforcement agreement are different instruments. Their purposes, obligations and implementation arrangements should be examined individually.

In my chapter on Papua New Guinea in Blue Security in the Indo-Pacific, I discussed maritime surveillance, law enforcement, border management and the institutional weaknesses that affect implementation. The broader lesson remains relevant: external cooperation needs to address specific gaps in PNG’s ability to govern and protect its territory and maritime jurisdiction.

Three areas should be central to that discussion.

Strengthen our ability to monitor and protect our borders

PNG needs the ability to monitor its land borders, airspace and maritime jurisdiction, detect unlawful activity and organise an appropriate response.

For our land borders, Australian and American assistance could support communications, transport, logistics, suitable facilities and training for personnel operating in remote locations. Engagement with border communities should also be part of planning, with accessible and accountable arrangements for reporting suspicious activity.

For airspace monitoring, PNG should identify gaps in surveillance coverage, information exchange and coordination between civil aviation and security agencies. Partners could help assess suitable radar and other surveillance options, train personnel and improve the timely reporting of suspicious flights. Any system must be affordable to operate and maintain.

At sea, priorities should include access to surveillance information, serviceable patrol vessels, trained crews, maintenance support and reliable operating budgets. Australia’s maritime security assistance and the United States’ Shiprider arrangements provide foundations for cooperation. PNG should assess how to use them to strengthen its own sustained operational capability. The Shiprider agreement specifically supports PNG’s exercise of maritime law enforcement authority.

A surveillance report achieves little if the responsible agency cannot deploy. A patrol vessel has limited value without fuel, maintenance and a qualified crew. Every equipment or infrastructure proposal should therefore include its full operating requirements, PNG’s financial contribution and a plan for sustaining it.

Border security also involves several civilian agencies. The PNGDF’s contribution must fit alongside police, Customs, immigration, fisheries and other authorities, each acting within its lawful mandate.

Build our intelligence collection, analysis and sharing capacity

PNG must be able to identify emerging threats, assess their significance and provide timely advice to decision-makers. Receiving information from a partner is useful, but we also need the ability to evaluate it and develop our own assessments.

Australia and the United States could assist with analyst training, lawful collection methods, secure communications, information management and the preparation of intelligence assessments. Training should use problems relevant to PNG, including illicit trafficking, illegal fishing and suspicious cross-border activity.

Assistance should build teams and institutional knowledge. Officers returning from overseas courses should have opportunities to apply their skills, mentor colleagues and improve procedures. Otherwise, the benefit of training remains concentrated in individuals and can disappear when they move positions.

Information-sharing arrangements also need clear rules. Who receives the information? How quickly can it reach the agency able to act? What restrictions apply to its use and onward disclosure? How are sensitive sources and personal information protected?

The Pukpuk Treaty expressly provides for intelligence and security information sharing, subject to national laws and protection of sensitive information. PNG’s task is to translate that provision into arrangements that address its own requirements.

PNG should negotiate access to information relevant to its priorities while strengthening its ability to collect and assess information independently. External assessments should inform our judgement, and our officers must retain the ability to question their assumptions and relevance.

Make interagency coordination work

The third priority is coordination. A suspicious vessel may involve fisheries violations, immigration offences, Customs breaches and organised crime. Several agencies may hold different parts of the information needed to understand the threat.

Australia and the United States could support PNG-led exercises that test the complete response: receiving a report, assessing it, assigning responsibility, authorising action and preserving evidence for investigation and possible prosecution.

Assistance could also support compatible communications, liaison arrangements and clear operating procedures. PNG should assess and strengthen existing coordination mechanisms before creating additional structures.

The practical questions are straightforward. Which agency leads? Who can authorise deployment? Who pays for fuel? Who conducts an arrest? Who secures the evidence? Who reports the outcome?

These decisions should be settled before an incident occurs. Regular exercises should identify weaknesses, assign responsibility for correcting them and test whether those corrections work.

Give our officers the ability to direct cooperation

These priorities require officers who understand PNG’s Constitution, national policies, institutional mandates and international commitments. They also need skills in negotiation, project planning, budgeting and evaluation.

Foreign training can contribute to this development. PNG’s institutions must provide the national context, professional debate and civilian oversight that enable officers to assess what they learn against our own circumstances. Responsibility also rests with political leaders and senior officials, who must provide clear direction and fund agreed priorities.

Each major cooperation proposal should explain the PNG interest it serves, the capacity gap it addresses, the institution responsible for implementation and the costs PNG will carry. It should also identify how success will be measured and what continuing dependence on external support will remain.

Useful measures include equipment availability, patrol coverage, response times, the quality and timeliness of intelligence assessments, and demonstrated improvements in joint operations. Counting courses, visits and equipment handovers tells us much less about whether our security has improved.

Singirok’s warning should encourage closer scrutiny of the strategic direction of our defence relationships. Practical benefits do not remove questions about sovereignty, legal obligations or future commitments. Those questions require transparent explanation and proper oversight.

PNG also has a responsibility to exercise agency within these relationships. We need officers and institutions capable of directing cooperation towards our own priorities and holding implementation to account.

The question we should consistently put to Australia and the United States is: how will this program strengthen PNG’s ability to protect its borders, understand security threats and coordinate its own response?

Our defence partnerships should produce a PNG that is better able to make informed decisions and act on them.