Offensive structural realism

Central theme

Elman and Jensen (Realisms, 2013)

“States face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm another. Under such circumstances, relative capabilities are of overriding importance, and security requires acquiring as much power compared to other states as possible.”

Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2015)

“Posits an anarchic international system in which rational great powers uncertain of other states’ intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive. States need to accumulate power in order to ensure its security.”

Liu and Zhang (Liu & Zhang, 2006)

“Primary goal that states seek to achieve is power. States seek power as both a means and an end.”

Dynamics

Taliaferro (Taliaferro, 2000)

“Offensive realism holds that anarchy—the absence of a worldwide government or universal sovereign—provides strong incentives for expansion. All states strive to maximize their power relative to other states because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States under anarchy face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them. This compels states to improve their relative power positions through arms buildup, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.”

Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2015)

“Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2001) take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival.”

Examples

Case of China by Elman and Jensen (Realisms, 2013)

“Offensive realism paints a bleak picture of the future of international relations if China continues its ascent. Offensive realist argue that, given the required capabilities states will pursue regional hegemony as the best means of staying safe in a dangerous world. The United States did so in the nineteenth century, when it pushed the European powers out of the western hemisphere and went on to dominate the region. Most offensive realist stress that there is no reason to assume that, if given the chance, China will behave any differently.

In particular, offensive realism predicts that if China’s power continues to grow it is likely to assert greater control in Asia. China will invest more of its resources in military capabilities in order to become the predominant power in the region. While China may not use those capabilities to conquer its regional neighbours, it will use them to try to dictate how they behave. China will also look to force the United States from the region through a mix of military might and its own version of the Monroe Doctrine.

For their part, China’s neighbours and the United States are not likely to sit idly by and watch as China takes over. Fearing for their security, powerful countries, like Japan, Russia, and India, and small ones, like South Korea and Vietnam, will join the United States in a balancing coalition to counter China’s rise. Intense security competition between China and the American-led coalition is expected to result, with the United States pursuing aggressive policies in an attempt to remain the world’s only regional hegemon. While this rivalry will not guarantee violent conflict, it will create a situation where war is significantly more likely.”

Case of China by Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2015)

“The ultimate goal of the great powers, according to offensive realism, is to gain hegemony, because that is the best guarantor of survival. In practice, it is almost impossible for any country to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to project and sustain power around the planet and onto the territory of distant great powers. The best outcome that a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, which means dominating one’s own geographical area. The USA’s ‘Founding Fathers’ and their successors understood this basic logic and they worked assiduously to make the USA the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. It finally achieved regional hegemony in 1898. While the USA has grown even more powerful since then, and is today the most powerful state in the system, it is not a global hegemon.

States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other geographical regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several major states, who will then compete with each other and not be in a position to focus on them. Thus, after achieving regional dominance, the USA has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from controlling Asia and Europe. There were four great powers in the twentieth century that had the capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900–18), Imperial Japan (1931–45), Nazi Germany (1933–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–89). In each case, the USA played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons. In short, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world.

If offensive realism is correct, we should expect a rising China to imitate the USA and attempt to become a regional hegemon in Asia. China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push US military forces out of Asia, much the way the USA pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. China can be expected to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine.

From China’s perspective, these policy goals make good strategic sense. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the USA prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. All Chinese remember what happened in the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its backyard? US policymakers, after all, become incensed when other great powers send their military forces into the Western Hemisphere. They are invariably seen as a potential threat to US security. The same logic should apply to China.

It is clear from the historical record how US policy-makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The USA does not tolerate peer competitors, as it demonstrated in the twentieth century; it is determined to remain the only regional hegemon. Therefore, the USA will work hard to contain China and ultimately to weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to control the commanding heights in Asia. In essence, the USA is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China’s neighbours are also sure to fear its rise, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. In fact, there is already evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join a US-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the USA to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”

References

Elman, C., & Jensen, M. A. (2013). Realisms. In P. D. Williams, Security studies an introduction (pp. 15-31). New York: Routledge.

Liu, F., & Zhang, R. (2006). The typologies of realism. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 109-134.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2015, August 31). Structural realism. Retrieved from Chicago University: http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf

Taliaferro, J. W. (2000). Security seeking under anarchy defensive realism revisited . International Security, 128-161.

Wikipedia. (2015, August Saturday). Offensive realism. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism