Rationality, Religion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in PNG

By Bernard Yegiora

Introduction: why decision-making models matter

PNG’s foreign policy decisions have, at times, appeared inconsistent or difficult to reconcile when viewed purely through material or strategic interests. Positions taken on different international issues can seem coherent in one context and value-driven in another. This is not unusual. Foreign policy decisions everywhere are shaped by a mix of calculation, belief, domestic politics, and institutional constraints. Understanding how decisions are made therefore matters as much as evaluating what decisions are taken.

This article applies insights from foreign policy analysis (FPA) to examine variation in PNG’s foreign policy decision-making across two political periods. Using PNG’s policy positions on Israel as a case study, it contrasts decision-making logics associated with the O’Neill–Pato period and the Marape–Tkachenko period. The objective is not to assess whether specific policy choices were right or wrong, but to explain the decision-making frameworks that appear to have shaped them. The article argues that PNG foreign policy reflects a mixed decision-making pattern, combining rational calculation in some issue areas with poliheuristic constraints in others.

Analytical framework: rational and poliheuristic decision-making

Foreign policy analysis offers several models for understanding how decisions are made. Two are particularly relevant here.

The rational actor model assumes that decision-makers identify objectives, assess available options, weigh costs and benefits, and select the option that best advances perceived national interests. This model is often associated with institutionalised foreign policy processes, legal reasoning, and strategic calculation. While it simplifies reality, it remains a useful baseline for analysing decisions justified through international law, diplomatic norms, and material considerations.

By contrast, the poliheuristic decision-making model, developed by Alex Mintz and others, recognises that leaders often operate under non-compensatory constraints. In this model, certain factors—such as domestic political survival, ideological commitments, or deeply held beliefs—can eliminate policy options before any cost–benefit analysis occurs. Once an option violates a key constraint, it is discarded regardless of its potential strategic advantages.

Importantly, these models are not mutually exclusive. Most governments employ a combination of rational calculation and heuristic shortcuts, depending on the issue area, political context, and leadership dynamics. The question, therefore, is not whether PNG follows one model or the other, but when and why different logics dominate.

Case one: Israel policy during the O’Neill–Pato period

During the O’Neill–Pato period, PNG’s policy position on Israel was articulated in a way that largely reflected rational-institutional reasoning. Following a United Nations vote related to Israel, the issue was debated in Parliament, illustrating the role of legislative scrutiny in foreign policy discourse.

In that debate, Minister Sungi raised arguments grounded in religious belief, invoking scriptural notions of blessing associated with supporting Israel. This intervention is analytically significant because it introduced a value-based rationale into the policy discussion. However, the response by then Foreign Minister Pato shifted the justification back to international law, diplomatic calculation, and state interest. The emphasis was on PNG’s obligations, consistency with international norms, and the broader implications for the country’s foreign relations.

From an FPA perspective, this exchange is instructive. It shows that while religious or moral arguments were present in the political arena, the final policy justification relied on rational calculation. Parliament functioned as a site of contestation, but the dominant decision-making logic reflected institutional and legal reasoning rather than non-compensatory belief-based constraints.

 

Case two: Israel policy under the Marape–Tkachenko period

Under the Marape–Tkachenko period, PNG’s policy position on Israel shifted in a way that can be more convincingly explained through the poliheuristic model. Public statements and policy signals suggested that moral and religious considerations played a more prominent role in shaping the decision space.

Rather than framing the shift as “irrational,” it is analytically more accurate to interpret it as a case where non-compensatory constraints narrowed available policy options. In poliheuristic terms, once a policy position is framed as morally or religiously obligatory, alternative options—even those that might offer diplomatic or strategic benefits—are excluded from consideration at an early stage.

This does not imply the absence of calculation altogether. Rather, it suggests that calculation occurred within a constrained decision set. The key analytical point is that the hierarchy of considerations differed from the earlier period, with values and identity-based factors exerting greater influence over the decision-making process.

PNG Prime Minister James Marape meets Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz, reflecting the growing political symbolism of PNG–Israel relations and the domestic factors shaping foreign policy choices.

Why China policy looks different

A useful test of this argument is PNG’s approach to China. In contrast to the Israel case, PNG’s China policy has displayed a high degree of pragmatism and continuity across political periods. Decisions relating to China have been justified primarily through economic, developmental, and strategic considerations, including trade, investment, infrastructure, and education cooperation.

This pattern suggests that PNG foreign policy is not uniformly poliheuristic. Instead, different issue areas trigger different decision-making logics. Where economic development and state capacity are central, rational calculation tends to dominate. Where issues are framed in moral or identity terms, poliheuristic constraints become more salient.

This mixed pattern strengthens, rather than weakens, the analytical argument. It demonstrates that variation in decision-making logic is issue-specific, not simply a function of leadership style.

What this comparison tells us about PNG foreign policy

Taken together, these cases suggest that PNG foreign policy does not operate under a single, consistent decision-making model. Instead, it reflects a hybrid pattern, in which rational and poliheuristic logics coexist and compete.

Several implications follow. First, leadership beliefs and issue framing matter greatly in shaping which decision-making model becomes dominant. Second, institutional processes—such as parliamentary debate and bureaucratic advice—can moderate the influence of non-compensatory constraints, but only when they are actively engaged. Third, the absence of clearly institutionalised analytical procedures increases the likelihood of volatility across issue areas.

None of this is unique to PNG. However, for a small state operating in a complex international environment, inconsistency in decision-making logic can carry reputational and strategic costs.

Conclusion: implications for analysis and practice

The purpose of this analysis has not been to pass judgement on specific foreign policy choices, but to clarify how different decision-making logics shape outcomes. PNG’s foreign policy illustrates a broader reality of international politics: governments routinely blend rational calculation with heuristic shortcuts, particularly where values and beliefs are involved.

For analysts and policymakers, the key lesson is the importance of institutionalising analytical processes that can accommodate values without allowing them to override strategic assessment entirely. Understanding decision-making models is therefore not an academic exercise, but a practical tool for improving coherence, predictability, and credibility in PNG’s foreign policy.