Why PNG Needs an Institutional Foreign Policy Analysis Unit
By Bernard Yegiora
Key takeaways
• PNG has policy and advisory functions, but lacks a dedicated, institutionalised foreign policy analysis system.
• Inconsistent analytical processes increase volatility and weaken coherence for a small state.
• A modest, permanent analysis unit would strengthen decision-making without undermining political authority.
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| Screenshot from a news report announcing PNG’s adoption of a new Foreign Policy White Paper in November 2025, marking the first comprehensive update to the country’s foreign policy framework in over 40 years. |
Introduction: the issue is not engagement, but process
PNG is not disengaged from the world. It maintains diplomatic relations across regions, participates in multilateral forums, and increasingly debates foreign policy decisions in public and parliamentary spaces. This visibility is healthy. However, visibility alone does not guarantee coherence. What matters is how foreign policy decisions are made, not only how they are announced.
A persistent weakness in PNG’s foreign policy is not lack of intent or opportunity, but the absence of a clearly institutionalised foreign policy analysis system. When analytical processes are informal, uneven, or personality-dependent, decisions become vulnerable to short-term pressures, symbolic positioning, and leadership preferences. Over time, this produces inconsistency and uncertainty.
This article argues that PNG would benefit from a dedicated institutional foreign policy analysis unit—not to replace political decision-making, but to support it systematically.
What institutionalised foreign policy analysis means
Institutionalised foreign policy analysis refers to routine, standardised decision-support processes embedded within government. Rather than relying on ad hoc advice, it involves:
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identifying the national interest at stake
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outlining multiple policy options
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assessing political, economic, diplomatic, and security risks
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considering costs, benefits, and implementation requirements
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documenting decisions and enabling institutional learning
In “Enhancing Foreign Policy through Academic Consultation: The Case for DWU’s Inclusion,” I discussed how gaps in consultation and limited use of academic expertise can constrain the quality of foreign policy formulation. That article did not propose a structural blueprint; it highlighted weaknesses in how analysis and consultation are incorporated into decision-making. The same problem is evident in the absence of an institutionalised analytical process.
Institutionalising analysis does not depoliticise foreign policy. It disciplines political choice by ensuring decisions are informed, comparable, and transparent in their reasoning.
Why analytical discipline matters for small states
PNG operates as a small state in a competitive Indo-Pacific environment. In such contexts, foreign policy signals are closely interpreted by partners and neighbours. Inconsistency or unclear rationale can weaken credibility and bargaining power.
This concern connects to issues raised in “From 1981 to Today: Lessons from PNG’s Foreign Policy Reviews and the Role of Inclusivity.” In that article, I reflected on differences between earlier foreign policy review processes and more recent approaches, noting how inclusivity, bureaucratic input, and institutional memory matter for policy continuity. While historical in focus, the piece points to a broader lesson: where institutions are weakly embedded, policy coherence suffers over time.
Large states can absorb inconsistency. Small states cannot. For PNG, analytical discipline functions as risk management, not bureaucratic excess.
What volatility looks like in PNG foreign policy
Volatility does not always involve dramatic reversals. More often, it appears as uneven decision logic. Some foreign policy issues are handled through negotiation, inter-agency consultation, and technical assessment. Others appear shaped by domestic political pressures, values-based considerations, or leadership beliefs that narrow the decision space early.
This mixture is not unusual internationally. What matters is whether there is a consistent analytical filter to evaluate options before commitments are made. Where such a filter is weak or absent, coherence depends heavily on personalities rather than institutions.
Existing capacity—and its limits
PNG does not lack policy institutions. Analytical and advisory functions exist within the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Prime Minister & NEC, and line agencies. Officials routinely prepare briefs and provide advice.
However, this capacity is fragmented and unevenly institutionalised. There is no dedicated unit with a protected mandate to consistently produce structured options papers, risk assessments, and long-term strategic analysis across political cycles. As a result, the depth and quality of analysis can vary significantly between issues.
The issue, therefore, is not absence of capacity, but absence of institutional consolidation and standardisation.
What the scholarship tells us: Mitna’s contribution
This diagnosis aligns with the findings of Philip Mitna’s PhD research on PNG’s foreign policy. Mitna shows that foreign policy outcomes in PNG have often been shaped by elite agency, personalised leadership, and informal political norms, with formal institutions playing a secondary role.
Mitna does not argue that institutions are irrelevant. Rather, his work demonstrates that where analytical systems are weakly embedded, decision-making becomes reactive and episodic. His findings reinforce the argument that improving foreign policy outcomes requires institutionalising analytical processes, not relying on leadership change alone.
Knowledge, analysis, and institutional memory
A related challenge is the limited integration of research and academic perspectives into policy processes. In “Excluded from Our Own Story: Academia and the Foreign Policy White Paper,” I discussed how academic voices can be sidelined in national policy conversations, particularly during major policy formulation exercises.
This matters because without systematic mechanisms to absorb research and analysis, institutions struggle to build memory and learn from past decisions. Over time, this contributes to repetition, inconsistency, and policy drift.
The cost of decisions without process
When foreign policy decisions are not supported by structured analysis, several consequences follow:
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partners may question predictability and reliability
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commitments may outpace implementation capacity
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symbolic positioning may crowd out strategic planning
Foreign policy is not only about alignment or rhetoric. It is about delivery and credibility over time.
What a foreign policy analysis unit could realistically look like
PNG does not need a large new bureaucracy. A small unit embedded within existing structures—such as the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Department of the Prime Minister & NEC—could provide:
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standardised briefing templates
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inter-agency coordination
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continuity across political cycles
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documented analytical reasoning
Such a unit would support ministers and NEC by clarifying options and consequences, not by determining outcomes.
Conclusion: coherence as a national asset
Foreign policy in PNG will always involve political judgment. That is appropriate. What is not inevitable is inconsistency rooted in weak institutional processes.
In a complex strategic environment, coherence itself becomes a national asset. Institutionalising foreign policy analysis is not a technocratic exercise; it is a practical investment in credibility, continuity, and informed decision-making.

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