Repositioning Climate Diplomacy and Security in PNG: Aligning Academic Discourse with the Foreign Policy White Paper

By Bernard Yegiora

PNG’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2025 (pp. 57–58) establishes a clear strategic baseline: climate change is not a peripheral environmental issue but a core pillar of foreign policy, national development, and international engagement. When juxtaposed with the seven seminar questions derived from Goulding, Carter, Pascoe et al., and Hualupmomi, a critical insight emerges—PNG’s policy architecture is directionally sound, but operational execution remains constrained by structural, institutional, and geopolitical limitations.

For a full breakdown of the seven questions and their analytical framing, refer to the seminar recording here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJtT0C-dYyw

Screenshot from the seminar recording illustrating Question 1, which examines Goulding’s concept of Pacific Island states as “large ocean states” and its strategic relevance for enhancing regional influence in global climate change negotiations.

The first point of convergence lies in Goulding’s framing of Pacific Island countries as “large ocean states.” The White Paper implicitly supports this positioning through PNG’s engagement with multilateral platforms such as the UNFCCC, Small Island Developing States, and the Pacific Islands Forum. This identity is not merely rhetorical; it is a strategic asset. It allows PNG and its Pacific counterparts to aggregate influence, project moral authority, and frame climate change as a global justice issue. However, the White Paper stops short of fully capitalising on this identity. The absence of a clearly articulated diplomatic strategy to leverage “large ocean state” status in negotiations suggests a gap between conceptual framing and tactical deployment.

Second, Goulding’s emphasis on regional environmental initiatives—such as the Pacific Oceanscape—finds partial alignment in PNG’s policy emphasis on biodiversity and sustainable land use. The White Paper highlights PNG’s vast rainforest resources and its leadership role in the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. This positions PNG as a critical actor in global carbon sequestration efforts. However, the document acknowledges that mechanisms like REDD+ have “yet to reach their full potential.” This admission reflects a broader systemic issue: while PNG demonstrates environmental leadership, it remains dependent on external financing mechanisms that are slow, complex, and often inaccessible. The lesson here is straightforward—environmental diplomacy without financial leverage yields limited strategic returns.

Screenshot from page 58 of the Papua New Guinea Foreign Policy White Paper 2025 highlighting PNG’s leadership in REDD+ and global forest governance, while acknowledging that these initiatives have yet to achieve their full potential.

Carter’s analysis of the Boe Declaration introduces a securitisation lens, framing climate change as the region’s foremost security threat. While the White Paper does not explicitly adopt securitisation language, it implicitly recognises climate-induced risks—food insecurity, displacement, infrastructure damage, and economic disruption. This reflects a partial integration of climate into national security thinking. However, the lack of explicit linkage between climate policy and security institutions—such as the National Security Council or intelligence apparatus—indicates an institutional fragmentation. In effect, PNG acknowledges the threat but has yet to fully integrate it into a whole-of-government security framework.

The fourth seminar question—on the effectiveness of Pacific collective diplomacy—reveals a mixed performance. The White Paper underscores PNG’s proactive engagement with the Paris Agreement and its Nationally Determined Contributions, including the ambitious “30 by 30” Climate Change Response Roadmap. These commitments signal alignment with global norms and reinforce PNG’s credibility as a responsible international actor. However, influence should not be conflated with participation. Despite active engagement, the persistent challenge of accessing climate finance—particularly through mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund—demonstrates the structural inequities embedded within global climate governance. Pacific voices may be heard, but they are not yet decisive.

The most critical divergence emerges in the discussion of REDD+, as highlighted by Pascoe et al. The White Paper presents REDD+ as a strategic opportunity for sustainable forest management and revenue generation. Yet, the seminar question exposes the underlying tension: REDD+ can inadvertently marginalise rural communities by framing subsistence agriculture as a driver of deforestation. This creates a policy contradiction. On one hand, PNG seeks to monetise its forests through global mechanisms; on the other, it risks undermining the livelihoods of communities that depend on those same forests. The White Paper acknowledges implementation challenges but does not sufficiently address the socio-economic trade-offs. A recalibrated approach is required—one that integrates human security into climate policy design, rather than treating it as a secondary consideration.

Hualupmomi’s concept of complex adaptive systems provides a useful analytical bridge between policy intent and implementation reality. The White Paper outlines multiple frameworks—the Climate Change Development Authority, the National Climate Change Policy, and the NDC Implementation Plan. However, these operate within a fragmented institutional ecosystem. A complex adaptive systems approach would require greater policy coherence, inter-agency coordination, and real-time responsiveness to emerging risks. In practical terms, this means integrating climate considerations across sectors—defence, agriculture, infrastructure, and foreign affairs—rather than siloing them within environmental agencies.

Finally, the integration of climate resilience into broader security frameworks remains underdeveloped. While the White Paper recognises climate vulnerability, it does not fully articulate how resilience will be embedded within national security planning. This is a strategic oversight. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and creating cascading risks across sectors. PNG, therefore, needs to move beyond policy acknowledgment toward institutional integration—embedding climate intelligence into security assessments, planning processes, and operational responses.

In conclusion, the comparison between the seminar questions and the White Paper reveals a familiar pattern: strong strategic intent, credible international positioning, but limited operational depth. PNG has established itself as a proactive actor in global climate diplomacy, leveraging its environmental assets and multilateral engagements. However, to translate this into tangible outcomes, three priorities are non-negotiable. First, strengthen diplomatic leverage by operationalising the “large ocean state” identity. Second, reform access to climate finance through capacity-building and strategic partnerships. Third, integrate climate change into national security frameworks using a whole-of-government approach.

Absent these adjustments, PNG risks remaining a norm-compliant participant in global climate governance rather than a decisive strategic actor.