PNG should reassess its automatic support for Israel at the UN

By Bernard Yegiora

PNG’s foreign policy should be guided by national interest, not sentiment, symbolism, or diplomatic habit. The Foreign Policy White Paper presents support for Israel as a settled position, linked to the 2013 bilateral declaration, the 2023 opening of PNG’s embassy in Jerusalem, and a stated intention to expand cooperation in agriculture, security and information technology. That is a major strategic commitment. It should therefore be subjected to continuous review, especially when the Middle East is entering a more dangerous and more legally contested phase. 

Screenshot from Pillar 1: Strong Bilateral Relationships, page 48 of the Papua New Guinea Foreign Policy White Paper 2025, highlighting PNG’s stated position as a “consistent supporter of Israel in the United Nations.”

The immediate policy problem is that PNG’s support at the UN looks increasingly automatic. Open-source UN records show PNG voting with Israel and a very small minority of states on multiple Palestine-related resolutions in 2024 and 2025, including resolutions on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, Palestinian self-determination, Israeli settlements, UNRWA, and follow-up to the ICJ advisory opinion. That voting pattern is no longer a minor diplomatic detail. It is a visible foreign policy signal that places PNG on the outer edge of international opinion. 

UN General Assembly voting record on resolution A/C.2/80/L.34 (11 December 2025) on the permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory—showing overwhelming support (152 in favour), with PNG voting against alongside a small minority.

That would already justify a review. But the regional security environment has deteriorated further. In the past week alone, Reuters and Al Jazeera have reported Israeli plans to extend a buffer zone in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, continued deadly strikes in Beirut, large-scale displacement in Lebanon, and new legal and political controversy over Israeli policy in the West Bank. At the same time, UN humanitarian reporting continues to describe dire conditions in Gaza, where displacement, shelter destruction, water and sanitation problems, and continuing civilian vulnerability remain acute. A small state like PNG cannot ignore this context and continue to vote as though nothing has changed.

There is also a legal and reputational dimension. The International Court of Justice has already issued provisional measures in the South Africa v. Israel case, and the UN General Assembly has continued to adopt resolutions tied to the Court’s advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations in the occupied Palestinian territory. Whether one agrees with every legal argument or not, the direction of travel in international law and multilateral diplomacy is clear: scrutiny is intensifying, not declining. For PNG to remain a near-automatic defender of Israel at the UN is to assume mounting reputational cost without first proving a commensurate national return.

That brings us to the hard question of interests. What exactly has PNG gained? The public record does show bilateral activity: Israel offered assistance in defence, security and intelligence-related capacity building in 2013; the Marape government secured MASHAV training and announced expanded cooperation in agriculture and other sectors in 2023; and in 2025 the PNG IPA facilitated an Israeli fact-finding mission focused on ICT and cybersecurity. There are also references to private agricultural ventures linked to Israeli business interests, such as hydroponic and dairy projects. But these are not the same thing as major state-led investment, large-scale concessional finance, or transformative infrastructure delivery. On the evidence available in open sources, the case for “significant Israeli government investment” in PNG is weak. The record shows training, technical cooperation, diplomatic symbolism, exploratory delegations, and some private-sector activity. It does not clearly show major Israeli government capital investment on a scale that would justify automatic political cover at the UN.

That does not mean PNG should rupture relations with Israel. That would be strategically careless. Israel remains relevant in agricultural technology, water management, cybersecurity, and niche technical training, and PNG can still engage in those areas where there is a concrete development return. But engagement is one thing; diplomatic subordination is another. A serious foreign policy must distinguish between selective cooperation and unconditional political alignment. PNG should keep the first and abandon the second.

The short-term policy advice is straightforward. First, the government should direct the Department of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence Organization, and relevant line agencies to prepare a rapid assessment of PNG’s UN voting record on Israel-Palestine since the Jerusalem embassy decision, including diplomatic costs and benefits. Second, Treasury, IPA, and Foreign Affairs should produce an evidence-based inventory of actual Israeli economic engagement in PNG, separating government assistance, private investment, training support, announced projects, and projects actually delivered. Third, PNG should adopt a case-by-case voting approach at the UN grounded in law, humanitarian impact, and PNG’s national interest, rather than bloc loyalty or religious sentiment. Fourth, Port Moresby should broaden its consultations before major UN votes by seeking assessments from missions in New York, Arab partners, Pacific partners, and credible humanitarian and legal sources.

The strategic point is simple. Foreign policy cannot be run on soft power alone. Israel has clearly succeeded in shaping political sentiment in PNG through religion, symbolism, elite diplomacy, and niche cooperation. That is real influence. But influence must not replace analysis. If PNG continues to support Israel consistently at the UN while the regional war widens, legal scrutiny deepens, and the material benefits remain modest or unproven, then PNG is not practicing strategic statecraft. It is outsourcing judgment. The government should therefore reassess its UN posture now, while retaining room for pragmatic bilateral cooperation where tangible gains can actually be demonstrated.