Strategic Trust Under Review: What Cuba, Iran, and PNG’s Own Foreign Policy Tell Us About the United States

By Bernard Yegiora 

PNG’s foreign policy is entering a decisive phase. The Foreign Policy White Paper 2025 positions the United States as a central partner in security, trade, and development. At face value, the policy reflects confidence. But a closer reading reveals something more measured—something policymakers cannot afford to ignore.

Screenshot of the cover page of the PNG Foreign Policy White Paper 2025.

The White Paper states that PNG and the US enjoy “strong and amicable ties… based on our shared history and values,” and recognises the US as “a major economic partner” with a growing role in regional security. These are not abstract claims. They are reinforced by concrete agreements: the 2022 Defence Aid Agreement, the 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement, and the Ship Rider Agreement, all of which deepen operational alignment between Port Moresby and Washington. 

Screenshot of page 47 of the PNG Foreign Policy White Paper 2025.

From a policy standpoint, PNG is clearly scaling up its engagement with the US.

However, the same document introduces a critical qualification—one that deserves far greater scrutiny than it has received. It acknowledges that “the implications of the US Administration’s policies on climate change, aid and tariffs are not yet fully clear.” This is not a minor caveat. It is a strategic signal. It reflects an implicit recognition that US policy is subject to change, and that such changes may directly affect PNG’s national interests.

Screenshot of page 47 of the PNG Foreign Policy White Paper 2025.

The White Paper attempts to balance this uncertainty by asserting confidence in the “underlying strength of our bilateral relationship.” But this confidence is political rather than structural. It assumes continuity in US commitments—an assumption that recent international experience calls into question.

The cases of Cuba and Iran are instructive. In both instances, agreements reached with the US were not sustained across administrations. In Cuba’s case, normalization efforts were reversed despite compliance. In Iran’s case, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was abandoned unilaterally, even after verification mechanisms confirmed adherence. These are not isolated diplomatic incidents. They reflect a systemic feature of US foreign policy: agreements can be recalibrated or reversed in line with domestic political shifts.

For PNG, the implication is straightforward. The risk is not engagement with the US—the risk is unconditional reliance.

The White Paper itself provides the strategic direction needed to manage this risk, even if it does not explicitly frame it in these terms. It calls for partnerships based on “mutual respect, mutual benefit and reciprocity,” and emphasizes selective engagement and diversification of relationships. This aligns with PNG’s long-standing foreign policy doctrine of “friend to all, enemy to none.” In practical terms, it means PNG must avoid strategic overcommitment to any single partner.

This is where the Cuba and Iran lessons become directly relevant—not as ideological critiques, but as empirical case studies in great power behaviour.

PNG’s strategic posture should therefore be recalibrated along three lines.

First, institutionalise risk assessment within all bilateral agreements with the US. This requires scenario planning at the National Security Council and National Executive Council levels, specifically addressing the possibility of policy reversal in Washington.

Second, embed legal and operational safeguards in all major agreements. Defence, security, and development frameworks must include review clauses, renegotiation triggers, and exit options. Agreements must be resilient to political change—not dependent on goodwill.

Third, accelerate diversification of strategic partnerships. The White Paper already signals this direction through its emphasis on broadening relationships across regions. This must now be operationalised. Engagement with Australia, China, Japan, the EU, and emerging partners must be structured as a portfolio—not a hierarchy.

The central issue is credibility. In international relations, trust is not built on statements—it is built on consistency over time. The US remains a critical partner. But the empirical record demonstrates that its commitments are not immune to domestic political shifts.

PNG’s foreign policy framework recognises both opportunity and uncertainty. The task now is to close the gap between recognition and implementation.

The lesson from Cuba and Iran is not that PNG should disengage. It is that PNG must engage with clarity, discipline, and strategic foresight.

In practical terms: engage, but hedge. Cooperate, but verify. Partner, but never depend.