Reclaiming Jomard Passage: Why PNG Must Start Charging Transit Fees

By Bernard Yegiora 

The global maritime order is no longer operating on passive assumptions of free access. It is shifting toward strategic control, and states are beginning to assert their interests over critical waterways. Iran’s move to charge vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz is a clear signal that the rules are being tested. Indonesia’s discussions around the Malacca Strait reinforce the same trajectory. These developments are not anomalies—they reflect a recalibration of how sovereign states interpret control over maritime space. PNG must read this shift carefully and respond with intent.

For too long, the Jomard Passage has been treated as a neutral corridor rather than a national asset. This is a fundamental policy failure. The passage sits within PNG’s maritime domain and serves as a route for international shipping, yet the country derives minimal economic benefit from its use. At the same time, PNG carries the burden of environmental risk, maritime safety concerns, and the long-term costs associated with increased vessel traffic. This imbalance is no longer tenable.

Map showing the Jomard Passage, a critical maritime corridor linking the Solomon Sea and the Coral Sea and serving as a key international shipping route for vessels traveling between Australia and North Asia. The passage handles significant daily traffic and is recognised as both a strategic asset and an economic opportunity for PNG.

The call to commercialise the Jomard Passage is not new, and it is not isolated. A recent letter published in The National argues that PNG should follow the example of states like Iran and impose fees on ships transiting its waters. The argument is straightforward: if such a system had already been in place, revenue generated could have supported recovery efforts in Milne Bay following Cyclone Maila. That perspective captures a broader frustration within the domestic policy space—PNG is allowing value to pass through its territory without extracting any meaningful return.

Critics will immediately turn to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principle of transit passage. That is expected. However, international law does not operate in a vacuum; it evolves through state practice. Iran is not waiting for legal consensus before acting. It is asserting its position and forcing a response from the international system. PNG does not need to adopt a confrontational posture, but it must recognise that rigid adherence to outdated interpretations will leave it strategically marginalised.

There is already a foundation to build upon. The move toward compulsory pilotage in the Jomard Passage demonstrates that PNG has begun to think in terms of monetisation and regulatory control. The next step is to move beyond limited service charges and establish a structured fee regime for vessels transiting the passage. This must be framed clearly as a sovereign economic measure, grounded in maritime safety, environmental protection, and national development priorities. With the right legislative backing and institutional support through the National Maritime Safety Authority, this is entirely achievable.

This is not simply about revenue generation; it is about strategic positioning. Control over maritime space translates into economic leverage. If PNG continues to allow unrestricted use of the Jomard Passage, it effectively subsidises global shipping while neglecting its own development needs. A fee regime, even if modest at the outset, signals a shift in posture—from passive host to active regulator.

At the same time, PNG must approach expansion with discipline. The country controls other important maritime corridors, including the Vitiaz Strait, which connects major sea routes in the northern maritime region. However, extending a fee regime to such waterways at this stage would be premature. The legal and operational complexities are greater, and the potential for resistance is significantly higher. The correct approach is sequential: establish, test, and defend a Jomard Passage model first, build credibility and capacity, and then assess whether elements of that framework can be extended to other strategic corridors.

The reality is that the global system is moving toward competitive control of strategic spaces. States that fail to adapt will remain on the margins, watching others extract value from their own geography. PNG has a clear opportunity to act. The Jomard Passage is not just a shipping route—it is a strategic asset that can and should contribute to national development.

The call by Alotau MP Ricky Morris, reinforced by public commentary, reflects an emerging policy consensus. The issue is no longer whether PNG has the right to act. The issue is whether it has the strategic confidence to do so.

Screenshot of a The National report highlighting government intentions to assert control over the Jomard Passage, with officials noting the waterway’s heavy usage—around 9,000 vessels annually—and its strategic and environmental significance for PNG.