China’s Response to the Australia–PNG Defence Treaty: A Cautious Warning

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The Chinese Embassy in Port Moresby has issued its first official response to the joint communiqué between PNG and Australia on a Mutual Defence Treaty. The tone of the statement is carefully balanced: on the one hand, Beijing acknowledges PNG’s sovereign right to sign treaties with other states, a right explicitly provided for under Section 117 of the Constitution; on the other, it lays down clear red lines. For PNG, this response underscores the delicate balancing act it must perform in navigating its most important bilateral relationships.

China’s official response to the Australia–PNG Defence Treaty: respect for PNG’s sovereignty, but with clear warnings against exclusivity, targeting third parties, or undermining China’s long-term interests.

The first key point is China’s invocation of the principle of non-interference. This framing signals respect for PNG’s sovereignty and projects an image of China as a partner that does not dictate terms. At face value, it reassures Port Moresby that Beijing will not openly oppose the signing of the Defence Treaty. Yet beneath this language lies a quiet warning: sovereignty should not be used as a cover for undermining China’s strategic interests in the Pacific.

Second, China explicitly warns against the treaty being “exclusive in nature.” This is a crucial phrase. Beijing is signalling that while it accepts PNG–Australia defence cooperation, it will not tolerate any arrangement that effectively shuts China out of future security or development opportunities in PNG. The subtext is clear: if the treaty evolves into a mechanism that sidelines Beijing, relations will sour.

Third, the Chinese statement rejects any arrangement that would restrict PNG from cooperating with a third party. This is Beijing’s way of pre-empting a scenario in which the Defence Treaty creates binding obligations that prevent Port Moresby from engaging with China on military or strategic issues. In practice, China is reminding PNG not to allow Australia to monopolise its defence relationships.

Fourth, China raises the issue of “targeting any third party.” This is directed squarely at concerns that the Defence Treaty could be used as part of a Western security network aimed at countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s sensitivity here is unsurprising. China has long opposed the militarisation of the Pacific and sees defence treaties with Western allies as veiled attempts to contain its influence. For PNG, this warning is a reminder that its moves are being closely scrutinised in the wider chessboard of great-power rivalry.

Fifth, the call for PNG to uphold independence and self-reliance is another layer of caution. On the surface, it reads as encouragement. But in reality, it is a subtle critique of the Defence Treaty itself—an insinuation that signing such a pact with Australia risks undermining PNG’s autonomy. Beijing is effectively saying: “Do not let this treaty make you dependent or compromise your freedom of action.”

Sixth, China emphasises the need for PNG to “properly handle issues bearing on sovereignty and long-term interests.” This is diplomatic code for urging PNG to think beyond immediate benefits and consider how entanglement with Australia may affect its ability to balance relations with China in the long run. Beijing is pushing PNG to adopt a more cautious, selective engagement that does not lock it into one camp.

Seventh, the conclusion of the statement highlights Beijing’s priority: the sound development of China–PNG relations. This is both a reminder and an offer. A reminder that China considers the relationship valuable and expects it not to be undermined, and an offer that mutually beneficial cooperation remains on the table—so long as PNG avoids crossing certain red lines.

Ultimately, China’s response is measured but pointed. It does not escalate, but it makes it abundantly clear that Beijing will be watching how the Defence Treaty is implemented. For PNG, the message is sobering: the treaty may strengthen security ties with Australia, but it also places the country in a more precarious position in its dealings with China. The challenge now is whether PNG can manage this balancing act without compromising either sovereignty or strategic flexibility.

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