Papa, Lombrum, and PNG’s Strategic Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific

By Bernard Yegiora 

The strategic concern surrounding Papa and Lombrum highlights the depth of PNG’s entanglement in great power competition. On the surface, these facilities are framed as projects to bolster PNG’s infrastructure, maritime capacity, and regional security cooperation. Yet beneath that veneer lies a clear geopolitical calculus: Australia and the U.S. are embedding themselves into PNG’s geography as part of their broader strategic hedging against a rising China. The notion that Papa could become a refuelling hub and Lombrum a forward operating base is not speculation; it reflects long-standing patterns of external powers leveraging PNG’s location to offset their own vulnerabilities.

Papa’s selection is particularly instructive. Its proximity to northern Australia provides strategic depth to Canberra and, by extension, Washington. In military planning, distance translates into both opportunity and constraint. For Australia, having an offshore hub close enough to manage logistics but far enough to diffuse risk offers significant advantage. For the U.S., the decision to directly fund and construct a large-scale fuel storage facility at Papa underscores its intent to secure reliable supply lines in the Pacific theatre. This is not simply an economic investment but a military contingency, embedding U.S. logistics deep into PNG’s soil.

U.S. and PNG officials break ground on the K1.6 billion fuel storage facility at Papa, Central Province, on September 18, 2025. The project, spearheaded by the U.S., will serve as a critical refuelling hub in the Pacific, underscoring PNG’s growing role in regional strategic competition.

Lombrum on Manus Island has long been at the center of strategic competition. Its deep-water harbour and central location in the Pacific make it a natural anchor for foreign military interests. The redevelopment efforts led by Australia and supported by the U.S. were never solely about “capacity building” for the PNG Defence Force. Instead, they reflect a dual-use calculus—serving both local needs and allied military requirements in the event of a regional conflict. If tensions with China escalate, Lombrum is unlikely to remain just a training site; it risks being operationalized as a forward staging point.

 

This dual-use logic fits neatly into what strategists call “hedging.” Australia and the U.S. are hedging against Chinese expansion in the Pacific by locking PNG into their network of military access points. The strategy is subtle: rather than outright bases, they create facilities with ambiguous status—civilian in peacetime, military-ready in crisis. The U.S.-built fuel storage facility at Papa epitomizes this ambiguity, enabling plausible deniability while guaranteeing strategic reach. PNG becomes a pawn in a regional deterrence architecture it does not fully control.

For PNG leaders, the dilemma is stark. On the one hand, these projects bring material benefits: infrastructure upgrades, local employment, and international attention. On the other hand, they expose the country to heightened strategic risk. Should a confrontation erupt between the U.S. and China, PNG would not be a bystander; Papa and Lombrum could instantly transform into targets. History shows that small states hosting foreign military facilities rarely escape the consequences of great power conflict. PNG’s geography, once an asset, could become a liability overnight.

It is also important to see the continuity here. PNG’s Look North policy, its balancing act between Australia and China, and its tradition of “friends to all, enemies to none” are being tested in unprecedented ways. Hosting Australian- and U.S.-backed facilities on one hand, while welcoming Chinese economic projects on the other, creates a precarious balancing act. The strategic hedging is not just by Canberra and Washington—Port Moresby itself is hedging, trying to extract benefits from both sides without being forced into binary alignment. The risk is that PNG miscalculates and finds itself overcommitted to one camp.

The choice of Papa reinforces that geography is destiny. While PNG leaders may claim neutrality, the cold reality is that strategic planners in Canberra, Washington, and Beijing see PNG not as neutral ground but as contested space. Papa’s location gives Australia logistical depth; Lombrum’s harbour gives it operational reach. The fact that the U.S. is spearheading fuel infrastructure at Papa makes the strategic intent more transparent: these facilities are about projecting power and ensuring supply in an uncertain Indo-Pacific environment.

The critical question, then, is whether PNG can craft a proactive policy that secures tangible benefits while limiting strategic entrapment. This requires transparency, public debate, and parliamentary oversight—elements often lacking in past security arrangements. Without them, PNG risks drifting into the role of a client state, with its territory serving as an extension of foreign militaries. Papa and Lombrum are more than facilities; they are symbols of PNG’s strategic crossroads, where sovereignty and security are increasingly subject to external calculations.