If Given the Opportunity: An IR Academic’s Review of the Australia–PNG Defence Treaty
If I were given the opportunity to review the Australia–PNG Defence Treaty, I would approach it through the lens of national security and strategic autonomy. This treaty is being hailed as a historic milestone, but as an IR academic, my responsibility would be to go beyond the celebratory rhetoric and ask whether it truly makes PNG more secure, sovereign, and strategically resilient. My main argument is simple: the treaty must be measured not by its symbolism, but by how well it protects PNG’s interests across eight key dimensions.
The first area I would examine is strategic alignment. Any defence arrangement must sit within PNG’s own guiding documents—our National Security Policy, Defence White Paper, and the forthcoming Foreign Policy White Paper. The core question is whether the treaty strengthens PNG’s long-term security under Vision 2050 and MTDP IV, or whether it primarily anchors us into Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Without alignment, we risk fighting someone else’s battles while leaving our own vulnerabilities exposed.
Second, I would interrogate the treaty’s relevance to PNG’s real threat environment. Australia’s security concerns often revolve around China, freedom of navigation, and great-power rivalry. PNG, by contrast, faces tribal fighting, sorcery-accusation violence, disaster response, and transnational crime. A treaty that is more attuned to Canberra’s anxieties than to Port Moresby’s realities would be misaligned and risk making our Defence Force less relevant to the needs of our people.
Third, sovereignty and control would be non-negotiable. Here, I would scrutinise clauses relating to status of forces, rules of engagement, and the command structure in joint operations. The fundamental issue is whether PNG retains the right to say “no” when our national interests are at stake. A treaty that undermines decision-making authority is not a partnership; it is a form of dependency disguised as cooperation.
Fourth, I would assess whether the treaty helps us build capabilities or locks us into dependency. Training, intelligence sharing, and equipment support can modernise the PNGDF—but only if they are structured to foster independence. If our systems become wholly reliant on Australian supply chains, doctrines, and technologies, we may end up with a Defence Force that looks impressive on paper but cannot operate without its patron.
Fifth, the economic and resource security implications must be taken seriously. Defence cooperation costs money and can shift priorities away from education, health, and development. At the same time, protecting our ports, pipelines, and special economic zones is crucial for national wealth. A credible treaty would not only secure these assets but also create opportunities for local procurement and jobs rather than exporting all benefits abroad.
Sixth, geopolitics cannot be ignored. By signing such a treaty, PNG inevitably deepens its alignment with Australia and, by extension, Western frameworks like AUKUS and the Five Eyes alliance. This has clear advantages, but it could complicate relations with China, Indonesia, and ASEAN. PNG must avoid being trapped in great-power rivalry and instead use the treaty to reinforce our longstanding foreign policy posture of “active and selective engagement.”
Finally, oversight and safeguards would be a central focus. Does the treaty have review mechanisms, exit clauses, and accountability frameworks? How will misconduct by foreign personnel be addressed? Without these guardrails, PNG risks entering an arrangement that is hard to exit even if circumstances change. True security comes not only from allies but also from the ability to retain control of our choices.
In short, if I were tasked with reviewing the Australia–PNG Defence Treaty as an IR academic, these eight dimensions—strategic alignment, threat relevance, sovereignty, capacity, economy, geopolitics, politics, and safeguards—would guide my analysis. They ensure that PNG’s voice, sovereignty, and priorities remain at the centre of what is otherwise a complex web of regional power politics. The question is not whether partnership is good or bad, but whether this treaty genuinely empowers PNG to stand stronger in an uncertain region.
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