What PNG Can Learn from Southeast Asia’s Defence Partnerships

The Lowy Institute’s recent publication “Southeast Asia’s Evolving Defence Partnerships” offers critical lessons for countries on the periphery of Asia’s strategic chessboard. PNG, though not part of ASEAN, is no less exposed to the shifting balance of power. As Southeast Asian states diversify their defence relationships, PNG must read the signals carefully: a multipolar security environment demands agility, not dependence.

Lowy Institute’s August 2025 analysis on Southeast Asia’s evolving defence partnerships highlights how regional states are broadening their security ties beyond the US and China — a lesson PNG can adapt as it recalibrates its own defence strategy.

The report underscores how Southeast Asian nations have moved beyond binary choices between the US and China. Instead, they are engaging Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea through defence agreements, dialogues, and joint exercises. This diversification strategy is highly relevant for PNG, which still leans disproportionately on Australia and, increasingly, the US. To avoid over-reliance and strategic entanglement, PNG must adopt the same diversification mindset.

A core finding from Lowy is that three mechanisms matter most: formal agreements, structured dialogues, and regular joint exercises. PNG’s current partnerships remain thin across these dimensions, often reduced to aid projects, hardware donations, or one-off training. The country should prioritise institutionalising defence partnerships through clear memorandums of understanding, annual dialogue schedules, and regular field training with a broader set of partners.

Joint exercises, in particular, serve both practical and symbolic functions. For Southeast Asia, exercises like Super Garuda Shield and Exercise Komodo build interoperability while signalling regional credibility. PNG’s participation in regional maritime drills remains limited to observer roles. That posture is insufficient. Active participation would give PNG real capability dividends while elevating its standing as a credible security partner.

The logic of diversification in Southeast Asia is not just about building capability — it is about balancing great powers. PNG is at risk of being boxed into bilateral dependency at a time when major powers are competing for access and influence in the Pacific. By cultivating trilateral or minilateral partnerships — for instance, PNG–Australia–Japan on maritime surveillance, or PNG–India–Indonesia on humanitarian response — Port Moresby could position itself as an active shaper rather than a passive recipient of security arrangements.

Maritime security is the most urgent theatre. With porous borders, illegal fishing, and potential transnational crime, PNG cannot afford to treat defence cooperation as a diplomatic courtesy. The Lowy analysis points to institutionalised dialogues and agreements as the real drivers of capability. PNG should follow suit by locking in regular maritime security dialogues and embedding joint patrol arrangements into standing agreements, rather than relying on donor goodwill.

Perhaps the most important lesson is institutionalisation. Southeast Asia’s partnerships endure because they are housed in ministries and defence white papers, not in the personal networks of politicians. PNG has long suffered from personalised diplomacy and inconsistent follow-through. If it wants sustainable security, it must embed partnerships in enduring institutions — the Defence Department, National Security Council, and legally binding frameworks — so they survive leadership turnover.

Ultimately, the Lowy Institute report should be read in Port Moresby as a blueprint. PNG cannot remain reactive in a security environment where competition is intensifying. By diversifying partners, institutionalising cooperation, and embedding itself in regional security networks, PNG can build a sovereign defence posture that is resilient, credible, and strategically relevant in the wider Indo-Pacific. Anything less risks leaving the country vulnerable in an increasingly contested region.