What If China Creates a Program Similar to the New Colombo Plan Under the Belt and Road Initiative?

The New Colombo Plan (NCP) has been a key part of Australia's strategy to strengthen people-to-people ties and deepen engagement with the Indo-Pacific. However, as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expands, the possibility of China creating its version of the NCP becomes a critical question. Such a program, targeting developing countries in the Pacific region like Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa, could reshape the balance of influence in the region. If Australia does not respond by strengthening its efforts, China’s potential program could undermine Australia’s leadership and further entrench Beijing’s influence in the Pacific.

A screenshot from The National newspaper shows the two New Colombo Plan students who chose to study for a semester at Divine Word University and the University of Technology in PNG.

 China’s BRI is a global development strategy designed to expand its influence through infrastructure projects, trade, and investments. A Chinese program modeled after the NCP could complement the BRI by focusing on educational and cultural exchanges in Pacific Island nations. Targeting countries like PNG, Solomon Islands, and Fiji—already significant partners in the BRI—would allow China to embed itself more deeply into the socio-political and cultural fabric of these nations. Educational exchanges could align with ongoing infrastructure projects, reinforcing China’s image as a key development partner.

While Australia’s NCP spans the Indo-Pacific, a Chinese equivalent would likely zero in on the Pacific region, where Australia’s influence has traditionally been dominant. Countries like PNG, Tonga, and Samoa have growing ties with China, particularly through Chinese-funded infrastructure and trade partnerships. By creating educational exchange programs in these nations, China could cultivate goodwill and train future leaders who are more attuned to Beijing’s development model. This approach would not only enhance China’s soft power but also consolidate its long-term strategic goals in the region.

Australia has historically been the Pacific's closest partner, with strong ties in trade, aid, and security. However, China’s growing presence in the Pacific has already created competition, as seen in the Solomon Islands’ controversial security pact with China. If China were to launch an education diplomacy program targeting Pacific nations, it would directly compete with Australia’s NCP and broader influence. For countries like PNG and Fiji, participating in both programs would deepen their relationships with both powers, but it would also give China a stronger foothold in a region critical to Australia’s strategic interests.

China’s financial resources give it a significant edge in creating large-scale programs. A Chinese NCP could offer scholarships, internships, and research opportunities to thousands of Pacific students and even include Chinese students studying in Pacific universities. Additionally, China’s ability to integrate such a program with its broader BRI objectives would create a compelling package for Pacific nations. By aligning educational exchanges with infrastructure investments and economic partnerships, China could present itself as a comprehensive development partner, making its program highly attractive to Pacific Island governments.

To counter this potential challenge, Australia must scale up and enhance its New Colombo Plan. This includes increasing funding, expanding the number of scholarships, and targeting more Pacific Island countries, especially those where China’s influence is growing. For example, Australia could invest in initiatives to improve the quality of education infrastructure in PNG, Fiji, and Solomon Islands, ensuring that its program not only provides scholarships but also strengthens the host nations’ capacity to deliver high-quality education. Such measures would not only secure Australia’s influence but also provide meaningful, sustainable benefits for the Pacific nations involved.

The NCP’s strength lies in its emphasis on cultural exchange and building goodwill. A Chinese version of the program, while capable of achieving similar objectives, might face skepticism from Pacific nations wary of China’s growing influence. However, this does not guarantee Australia’s position as a trusted partner. Australia must actively distinguish itself by demonstrating a commitment to mutual respect, long-term development, and shared values, rather than allowing its programs to appear transactional or insufficiently scaled. The quality and depth of Australia’s engagement will determine whether it can remain a preferred partner for Pacific nations.

If China creates a program similar to the NCP targeting Pacific nations, it would represent a significant shift in regional dynamics. For countries like PNG, Solomon Islands, and Fiji, participating in such a program would deepen their engagement with Beijing and potentially shift their allegiances in regional geopolitics. To prevent this, Australia must proactively enhance its NCP, ensuring it remains the preferred partner for Pacific nations. This includes addressing challenges such as safety, expanding access to scholarships, and integrating programs with broader development goals. By taking decisive action, Australia can secure its leadership in the Pacific and counter China’s growing influence in the region. The stakes are high, and the time to act is now.