A Dangerous Temptation: The Risks in Australia’s Defence Treaty with PNG

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Australia has already delivered substantial military hardware to the PNGDF under the Pacific Maritime Security Program and other bilateral arrangements. This includes four Guardian-class patrol boats, two PAC-750XL utility aircraft, and twelve up-armoured Land Cruiser vehicles designed for internal security operations. Canberra is also funding major upgrades to the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, home to HMPNGS Tarangau, and has expanded joint exercises such as Talisman Sabre to include PNG forces. These moves, coupled with intensive training programs, represent a rapid and tangible increase in PNGDF capability.

This build-up is already well underway. Australia is not merely planning to strengthen PNG’s defence capacity—it is actively doing so. Ships, vehicles, aircraft, and infrastructure are being paired with advanced training to improve operational readiness and interoperability. While the stated aim is to enhance border security, boost maritime surveillance, and contribute to regional stability, these new capabilities could be redirected in ways that Canberra may later regret.

The danger lies in how this strengthened military could be used under different political leadership. PNG’s political landscape is volatile, with leadership changes often bringing shifts in priorities and foreign policy direction. A future prime minister—less restrained than James Marape—could pursue a more confrontational agenda, such as military action against Indonesia in the name of West Papuan independence. This is not an abstract concern; West Papua remains a deeply emotional and politically charged issue in PNG.

AI-generated symbolic depiction of rising tensions — PNGDF and Indonesian forces in silhouette, with an Australian-supplied armoured vehicle at the centre and West Papua’s outline looming in the background.

The social conditions in PNG add further complexity. Youth unemployment is high, and incidents of mass violence—ranging from sorcery-accusation-related killings to the recent mass sexual harassment case at the University of Technology—highlight a worrying shift in behavioural norms among younger Papua New Guineans. Such unrest reflects deep frustrations that could be channeled towards militarized nationalism if given the right political spark.

A populist leader could frame a conflict with Indonesia as a unifying national cause, rallying public support through the promise of “liberating” fellow Melanesians in West Papua. In such a scenario, the PNGDF’s expanded capability would be an irresistible asset. Conscription could target the pool of disengaged Grade 10 and Grade 12 school leavers, offering them purpose through military service in a nationalistic cause. What begins as defence cooperation could end as the mobilization of an untested, politically charged force for a regional conflict.

For Australia, the strategic fallout would be severe. The Defence Treaty—intended to promote stability—could instead drag Canberra into a direct confrontation with Indonesia, one of its most important economic and security partners. Australia would face an impossible choice: support its treaty ally in a war it never intended to fight, or refuse and risk destroying a core bilateral security relationship. Either option would undermine Australia’s standing in the Indo-Pacific and fracture regional trust.

The solution is not to abandon the treaty, but to manage it with far greater caution. Capability transfers should be tied to strict conditions, with robust parliamentary oversight by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committee, transparent reporting, and clear limitations on the types of assets provided.. Training programs must embed strong civil-military discipline, human rights compliance, and a defensive—not offensive—doctrine. Infrastructure upgrades like Lombrum should prioritize maritime surveillance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief over power projection.

Australia’s challenge is clear: build PNG’s capacity without creating a force that could destabilize the region under the wrong leadership. Hardware alone cannot ensure stability. Without political safeguards, institutional maturity, and a disciplined strategic framework, the very assets designed to strengthen PNG could be turned towards dangerous ends. The Defence Treaty’s success—or failure—will rest on whether these risks are acknowledged and mitigated before it is too late.

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