Australia–PNG Defence Treaty: From WWII Sacrifice to 21st Century Power Politics

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PNG and Australia share a defence legacy forged during World War II. On the Kokoda Track and across the jungles of the Pacific, Papua New Guineans and Australians fought shoulder to shoulder in defence of freedom. That struggle produced the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF), formally established in 1973 but deeply shaped by Australian training, doctrine, and mentorship. In short, the history of PNG’s defence is inseparable from Australia’s.

Yet it has taken nearly fifty years since independence for a formal treaty to emerge. Why now? Canberra’s offer to sign a comprehensive defence agreement with PNG on **September 16, 2025—Independence Day—**is being presented as a milestone, but its timing reveals deeper motives. As The Guardian notes, this deal represents a new phase in what it describes as a “diplomatic knife fight” between Australia and China over PNG (The Guardian). The symbolism of signing on Independence Day is powerful, but the substance of the arrangement is where scrutiny is required.

Central to the debate is Canberra’s reported offer of Australian citizenship to PNG nationals who serve in the Australian Defence Force. While attractive for individuals seeking better pay and opportunity, this risks siphoning off PNGDF’s most capable personnel. At a time when PNG needs to strengthen—not weaken—its military capacity, why should its brightest officers be encouraged to migrate? Citizenship as inducement risks reducing the proud legacy of WWII comradeship to a transactional recruitment tool.

The broader geopolitical context cannot be ignored. PNG’s balancing act—“friends to all, enemies to none”—is under pressure. China, the United States, Indonesia, Japan, and New Zealand are all active in the region, competing for influence. The defence treaty with Australia may be overdue, but if framed narrowly as an anti-China hedge, it risks constraining PNG’s room to manoeuvre. A truly sovereign approach would pursue multiple binding defence arrangements—not only with Australia, but also with China, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia and the U.S.

This is where the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index offers valuable perspective. PNG currently ranks last (27th of 27) with a score of just 4.2 out of 100 (Lowy Power Index). Notably, PNG improved its diplomatic influence (+5.6) and defence networks (+1.4) in 2024. Defence treaties directly expand those metrics. By formalizing relationships with multiple powers, PNG can significantly elevate its power ranking, increase diplomatic clout, and strengthen its resilience.

PNG ranked 25th in Defence Networks in the 2024 Lowy Asia Power Index, showing slight improvement (+1.4) through defence diplomacy, but still scoring 0 in regional alliances and minimal progress in global defence partnerships.

However, power is not measured by signatures alone. The challenge lies in execution. Treaties must translate into practical outcomes: modernized barracks, interoperable training, maritime surveillance capacity, and institutional reforms. If they remain symbolic gestures driven by Canberra’s anxieties, the treaty risks becoming another chapter where PNG is the prize of a strategic contest, not an empowered partner.

There is also a domestic dimension. The PNG people must be convinced that defence treaties serve national sovereignty, not merely foreign strategic convenience. In WWII, young Papua New Guineans did not fight for citizenship or transactional benefits; they fought for their land and people. That spirit must remain the anchor of today’s decisions. Otherwise, foreign offers—no matter how generous—risk hollowing out PNG’s institutions and undermining public trust.

Ultimately, the upcoming treaty with Australia should be viewed as a starting point, not the end game. PNG’s strategic strength will not come from dependence on one partner but from cultivating multiple defence relationships across the Indo-Pacific. Doing so will not only honour the sacrifices of the past but also build a resilient foundation for PNG’s future. If managed wisely, September 16 could mark the beginning of PNG’s rise as a regional power of consequence.

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