Can PNG Replicate Vanuatu’s China Model for Maritime Security?

China’s donation of seven patrol boats to Vanuatu has once again highlighted Beijing’s use of hard security assets as tools of influence in the Pacific. Valued at around US $2 million, this package represents more than simple material support. It is part of China’s broader strategy of embedding itself into the security fabric of island states by offering low-cost, highly visible solutions to pressing maritime security gaps. The vessels strengthen Vanuatu’s ability to patrol its waters and signal its growing security partnership with Beijing.

China has handed over seven patrol boats to Vanuatu, reinforcing Beijing’s growing maritime footprint in the Pacific. Could PNG pursue a similar path to boost its own maritime security—or will the forthcoming defence treaty with Australia block that option?

For PNG, the example of Vanuatu raises immediate questions. PNG faces a maritime security deficit of its own. The Defence Force’s Maritime Element is under-resourced, operating mainly with Guardian-class patrol boats supplied by Australia. These vessels, while welcome, have been plagued by design flaws and ongoing sustainment issues. With an Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.4 million square kilometers, PNG’s reliance on ship-rider agreements with the U.S. and Australia highlights just how thin its own capabilities are stretched.

Chinese assistance, modeled on what Vanuatu has received, would appear to be an attractive option. Patrol boats are tangible assets that expand national sovereignty at sea, providing capacity to interdict illegal fishing and maritime crime. In the short term, such a donation would help plug glaring operational gaps. China has also been preparing to extend coast guard operations into the Pacific, which means that donated assets could be tied into a larger framework of Beijing’s maritime outreach. For Port Moresby, the appeal is obvious: more boats in the water and less reliance on foreign patrols.

Yet the strategic costs cannot be ignored. PNG is now preparing to sign a defence treaty with Australia, expected on 15 September 2025. This agreement will formalise joint exercises, base access, and personnel exchanges. Taking Chinese military hardware at this sensitive juncture risks sending mixed signals to both Canberra and Washington. It would complicate treaty implementation and could weaken the perception of PNG’s commitment to its primary security partner.

This is the core dilemma: capacity versus alignment. On one hand, PNG desperately needs to improve its maritime security capabilities. On the other hand, pursuing a Chinese-style arrangement like Vanuatu risks undermining the trust being built with Australia and the U.S. This is not simply about boats; it is about which strategic community PNG wants to anchor itself in. For a small state in a contested region, credibility with major partners is as valuable as physical assets.

There is also the issue of feasibility. As the Guardian-class experience has shown, platforms alone are not enough. Sustainment, spare parts, and trained personnel matter as much as delivery. Introducing Chinese-made patrol boats into PNG’s already strained naval infrastructure could create logistical complications. Without the necessary investment in docks, training, and maintenance contracts, even donated vessels risk becoming burdens rather than assets.

The lesson from Vanuatu is that China is willing and able to provide quick security wins at relatively low cost. PNG could replicate this model if it were willing to absorb the geopolitical consequences. However, given the timing of the Australia–PNG treaty, the political and strategic risks are high. In many ways, signing the treaty has boxed Port Moresby into a tighter alignment with its traditional partners. The price of that alliance may be forgoing the type of material benefits China is offering elsewhere in the Pacific.

As I argued in my chapter on Blue Security in the Indo-Pacific, true maritime security requires more than hardware. It demands coherent partnerships, sustainable frameworks, and long-term investment in national capacity. Patrol boats from China could provide PNG with immediate capability, but at the risk of eroding strategic alignment. Ultimately, PNG must decide whether short-term gains outweigh long-term commitments. In the current climate, the defence treaty with Australia suggests that Port Moresby has already chosen its path.